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1959 February 26 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 2729 
f'Ot.ICIF:S Ill I'I:CfiNG Gll>t>IANT 
Mr. MANSl"lEI..O. Mr. President, I, 
too, wlsh to speak on the Gt'1·mnn ques-
tion. I am sorry ~hnt 1 did no~ complete 
the prepnrnllon or my SPCC'Ch In time to 
gtve copie$ ~o my collcMues. to ~he om-
cia! Rcportct'S, or to the prc~s. 
I nm v.rnteful lo the Senator from 
ConnecttcuL for showmg me and others 
or his colleagues-If no~ all oc them-the 
courte:.y o! S<'ndlnft to us copies o! the 
m:umlflcent speech "hlch he has just 
completed. 1 comm.-nd h!m most hi!thl.v, 
bccau!«' 1 tlltnk he h:~s made a real con-
tribution to the publtc understanding of 
thiS mo~;t Important problem I believe 
that 1n emphttSII.HlG t.he difficulties which 
•;uti race our country and the free world 
on or before May 2'7. he has rendered a 
se1 vtce whtch should be nppreclated by 
all. 
He minced. no words In his speech. I 
shall mine~ no words In mine As a 
US. St>nator ftom the State of Mon-
t-1\na, hkt> the U.S. Senntor from the 
Staw or Connecticut or any other State, 
lllavt' a duty a.ud a responsibility to call 
m~· :;hots M I see lh('lll, to let the cards 
fall wher(' thc:y mn.y. 
So w1th tlus apoio·::y lo my cc-llea!l'lles. 
the omc:nl Reporters of Debates, and 
t.he pre.~s for noL huvln"' a prPp:tred. copy 
of mv liPPCch. nnd wllh my pubhc com-
mendatton and congratulations to the 
dtst!n~:ulshcd Senator ft•om Connecticut 
for making an excell<'nt speech and Jay-
in~; i~ on the llno. 1 wish 1.0 say thanks 
because he hns t'l'ndet·cd n public scrv1ce. 
I hol)c oth<'r Scnllt<li'S, ln addition to·the 
ScnnLOr from Connecticut nnd the Sen-
ator from New York, w11! hk!!WISe t.ake 
the floor and t1 y to lC'l the people or this 
country nnd the world know JUSt what 
the Anwncan positiOn r!:, and to c-mpha-
:.11-e ~hnt, tesnrdlcss of any differences 
as LO hO\\ we ~hall nchteve our objective, 
ther~· nre no dllfcrl'nces so fnr as our de-
Sire und our dCt('rmmntJ.on t<> remain 
1n West Bl'rlln nrc concl'rned. 
Some day~; ago, I discussed In the 
Senate the comm~: ct·i:>l!> m Germany. 
Other Member.. have llince contrtbuted 
to ttw dt:-cusslon or this critical matter. 
Thnt 1s nil w tlw good. I run persuaded. 
that out of thl~ turmoil of thought v.;u 
come a nun nnd po.~tu~e policy, a policy 
"hie h. c,·cn If 11. docs not ~It' lei a rapid 
resolution o! the G\.'tman situation, ''ill 
at least unite and steel the Nation !or 
tbe dangerous days whJch lie ahead. 
nu: P&06J'1ECt'IS l.H OgLMAHT 
Let there be no mistake about what 
does lle ahead This Js no diplomatic 
lark on which the world 1s about to em-
bark at .Berlln. This Is no child's piny 
c! blind man's bulr. 
When I addressed the Senate on li',eb-
ruary 12, Mr. President, I made a dele-
tion from my remarks just a !ew mo-
ments before I delivered. them. I did so 
because I dld not v.1~b to be undulY 
alarmist. Now the same thought has 
been expres..o;ed. by the Prime Minister ot 
the United Kingdom. n has been reco~:­
ruzed by Members or thls body such as 
the dtstingulshed Senntor from Ken-
tucky tMr. COOPER1 and lncreasmgly by 
the press. It 1s at le~~ beginning to 
smk home that the world ts entering 
mto a situa~ion in Germany in which 
the lives of tens o! mtlhons or people-
Americans Included-may well balance 
on the avoidance ot a single slgnlficnnt 
error. 
The British Prlme Minister warned, 
thll other dny, of a suicidal war by "mis-
calculation." As the disllngulshed Sen-
ator from Kentucky I Mr. MORTON J, e. 
former Assistant Secret<'\TY of State. hn.s 
said this afternoon. the British Prime 
Minister also used the word "muddling." 
I can say now "'1th !(renter MSurnnce 
what I intended t.o say but deleted from 
my remarks on February 12: "I express 
to the Senate my b('llef that just ahead 
lies n period which may well see the 
Nation and the rest of tht> world miltS a 
devastating war by a very narrO\\ mnr-
gln Indeed, tt Is a penod whleh may 
see us m war. lun1ted. "nr or unlimltl'd 
war. war by acc1dent or war by de-
sign, war by childish stubbornness or 
bravado.'' 
TKE 1tESPONSf:BU,..fTT 0.1' S!:NATOftS IN THE 
1:-.IP£'~ OlNC (;Rl$14 
It that is the case Mr. President, whot 
are the Members of this body to do? 
Are they to guard their silence when 
conscience compels them to speak? Are 
they to t~more their respons1b!llt1cs t<> 
their States and our country as lh!'y sec 
those responsibilities? Are they to ac-
cept as all-PCI'vaslve the undoubted 
wisdom of the President and the execu-
tive branch of the Government? Or 
are they to think !or them~;elves nnd 
speak for themselves? 
Are they to be more concerned with 
how words will sound abroad, and so hold 
their peace? Or must thry, even mot·c. 
seek to dtspel any uncertainties or the 
people of the Nation as to the coul'se 
which this Government Is pursuing, and 
to seek to do so by exnmtnlnR' the Issues 
which underlie that course? Are they 
to wait untllthey hcnr whnt the Dep:~rt­
ment of State has to say on the matter 
and then parrot agreement? Are they 
to wait to bear \\hat Mr. Khrushchev 
hns t<> say, so that they may be sure 
that what they sub:>equently ~ay v.lll be 
in disavreement? 
I do not know wbnt others may con-
tend in this matter. I can speak only 
for myself. For myself, Mr. President, 
I can say only that v.hc-n con.o;clence 
compels me to speak, I owe 1t t<> the 
people or my State and our country to 
speak out. For myself, Mr. President, 
I hold that the most important matter 
15 not how people abroad may Interpret 
my words. Important as that may be, 
lt is more Important that the people of 
my Stnte and our country understand 
fully what is at stake In this situation. 
More Important is the need of the peo-
ple of the United States to be satls6ed. 
that the course to whJch they are com-
mitted by their Government 1s a sound 
one. It t.hey are. to be asked to give their 
lives, as well they may be. then the course 
or this Government must represent the 
outgrowth or policies which reflect the 
deepest needs of tl}e people of the United. 
States. They must be policies which nre, 
In fact,, the best that can be devised by 
this Government to safeguard the Na-
tion and freed.om, and to do so, 1! pos-
sible, In peace. 
Mr. President, to those who say we 
may upset people abroad by our discus-
sions. I can only replY that we do not 
cool nnyone abroad If we fool ourselves 
nt home. The unity of the slogan may 
well be no unity at all. It may well be 
merely the facade of unity: the Com-
munist the totalllarlan concept of unity. 
The unlty of free man needs to rest 
on firmer ground. For the grim days 
which lie ahead in Germany, this Nation 
needs the unity which can come onlY 
from an understanding of where we 
stand. where It 1s we are headed, and why. 
To stand fast In Germany. as Indeed we 
must. we need. to think carefully. to think 
deeply, and we need to do it now. We 
need to speak out seriously, soberly. and 
we need lo do It now. The time to ex-
amme pollctes is before. not after. their 
consequences are upon us. I emphasize 
that point-before. not after-as In 
Korea a few years ago. 
POSffiON ON lWI. DI7LUS 
Mr. President, I yield to no one In my 
appreciation or the enormous burdens of 
the Secretary or State and his Depnrt-
ment. charged., as they are. with Prlmary 
respOnsibility, under t.he President, !or 
the Nation's policies. I believe the 
record or my poslt.ion in this matter Is 
very clear. I regard Mr. Dulles, as I 
have since I have known him, as an able 
and a dedicated civil seryant. I have 
endorsed many of the policies which have 
been pursued since he took office. I have 
worked wllh him closely, very closely, on 
several of these matters. I have never 
Celt, however, that Lhls constrained upon 
me a silence when I disagl'eed: nor, I am 
sure. did he. I favor the continuance of 
Mr. Dulles In office now. not out of any 
sentimentality, but because I believe that 
It his health permits, Mr. Dulles 1s capa-
ble of making an extremely shmiftcant 
t.:ontrtbutlon to the security of the Nation 
and to the search for peace, particularly 
M this time. 
I do noL believe In the concept of the 
indispensable man. However. I do be-
ll!!ve Lhat there are times ~•hen a snan 
may become vlrtuaUy indispensable. 
Becnuse or what Mr. Dulles has done over 
the past several months. cist>eclally dur-
Ing the p~t several weeks. In going to 
Western Europe and dlscussinl!' the B~'r­
lin and German matters with our albes, 
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and because ot hb ereat. C..''\PQCity, hlS 
~eat. knowledge, his great. ability, and 
the leadership which he has displayed, 
ln.sofar as t.he Berlin and ~rman situa-
tions arc concerned, he Is tn a \'Cry large 
sense lnd.isJX'nsnble. 
I hope that. any conferences covering 
these t'lllio questions-because they are 
interrelatcd-'1\111 be held In Washing-
ton. "'·here "'c can mnkc use of 1\tr. 
Dulles' capaciLles and abilities, t.o ad\ise 
and leAd the West. 
In the last. anal) "Sis, whether his health 
'11.'111 permit him to make thnt contribu-
tion ts for the President, the Secretary, 
and his doctors to decide, u the Presi-
dent so CO(Ienlly point~ out In hl.s press 
conference of February 25. 1959. 
Let me emphasize, howev('r, that be-
cause Mr. Dulles Is Ill Is no reason !or 
dcclartne a momtortum on a. fmnk and 
Iull discussion of the Nation's policies 
In the ll(lht or the critical slt.uatlon in 
Germany, I! 1 know Mt·. Dulles at all, 
he would be the first to recognize U1e 
need tor this dlscu~ion to continue. He 
would be the fil'llt. to denounce any 
ghoullsh political prontecrlng on his 111-
nes In order to silence this dtscusslon. 
There arc those who have expressed 
contusion as to how 1 can support :I.Ir. 
Dulles' continuance In omcc and still 
crltlcl7.c some of the policies executed 
under his name. I can only say that It 
1s not the first time, and I hope 1t is 
not the last. We shall have reached a 
very low point, Indeed, In the pract.lce 
of free and responsible £Overnment when 
a Senator hns no choice but to agree 
100 percent wiLh a secrctni'Y o! St:l.te 
or to hane him in emgy. 
I intend~ to go on as I have In this 
matter. 1 shall rndorse the foreign 
policies or lhls administration when 1 
believe they arc sound policies. I shall 
try to contribute constructh·ely to tneir 
reshapme when I believe that they are 
not-I repeat the word "constructively," 
bccau~c I have always tried to operate 
constructlvrty. Thnt ts a position, Mr. 
President, which I have maintained since 
I entered this body, and also during the 
10 year prior thereto when I serv~ as a 
mcmbrt· of the Committee on Foreign 
A.Jralrs of the House of Representatives. 
It 1s the position T propose to maintain so 
long ns I nm In the Sennte. I sh:lll 
D'UI.1nt.aln It regnt'CIII'SS of the party which 
Is responsible tor the ndmlnlstration or 
the Nallon's nffalrs. 
ATnTU1)& OS Ma, JtiDIOSIICnEV 
Further, I propose to say v.hat. I 
have to say when I h11.ve to say It, l.rre-
spect.lve or Mr. Khrushchev's threats or 
blandlshment.s.. It ls, to me, a matt~r 
or lndltrerence whether :.tr. Khrushchev 
agrees or dlsngrees with me. I hope thlS 
Government, Mr. President, w11l never, 
out of a timorous reeling that ~\f. Khru-
shchc\' may dlsapproH', !all to stand !or 
"'·hat It must at.nnd for. Equally, Mr. 
President., I hope that this Government 
v.ill never tall to act as It must. act out of 
an e\·en more Llmorous tecllnc that :1.1r. 
Khrushchev may appro\e. What I said 
on this point on February 12 I behe\'e 
bears repeallnz. I aatd then, and I say 
acaln today: 
H we are to be prrpartd «» tact! thlll cr!ds 
In OtrmM}', I~ wtll bo lx'6~ no~ ~o bccvme 
dl.tr."":.ed or ~b ' ~ b~ ~:he t'l<1ata anl1 ~u""' 
o! Soviet beh3~tor. 'nu= tundam .. ntnl quea-
tt<.n or policy tor WI 15 not ao mueh •hlllt 
the Russians are looking tor In Oermany. 
We know wha~ they a.re looking for and th"Y 
may ;ery well sdu 1t whlla we amuso or 
fuelnate oW"Selvea by uytng to lnt.nprH 
the charade.. ot RU&Btan bebavu.r. 
No. Mr Prestdent.lt Is more lmport.nnt 
to us far more Important, to know 11;hnt. 
we ourselves are seek.tnc in OermanY. 
We must bri.ng to this crisis not only 
courage, but also conviction. \Ve must 
bring t.o it a ~ltlve and understandable 
policy which meets our essential national 
needs and the essenttal needs ot freedom, 
and, lf possible. meets them In peace. 
It was that thought, .Mr. Prcsldl'nt, 
which prompted me to hat nine polnt1; for 
exploration In a search for n po.slUvo 
policy on Germany lo.\t February 12. 
Some o! these points were then. or at 
least have s!nce become, n part of the 
present olflclal policy or tile United 
States. Others are not a. purt or thnt 
policy. They represent whnt. t.o ml'. 
seem rational approaches to various 
aspects of the problem or Germany, In 
great. measure. th('y are not orll!lnal ex-
cept in their restatement, 81> my Insert.'> 
in the CONCRESSlOS.\L REC'OIID Of FebrU-
ary 16. 1959, will show. But tor their re-
statement in t.he context. o! the speech. 
I WlSh to make lt. clear thnt I clnlm Cull 
responsibility. 
&EC.~Pirt:'LATlON or Tlll: NISI: POINTS 
Mr. President. I :,hould now tn:c to 
review the rune pomts and to discuss 
their status in omclal pohcy nt the pr~­
ent time, as well as certain of the com-
ments which ha\·e b~n ma<!e upon them. 
On February 12 I sa1d: 
I can be wrong, And I atand reAdf to aecept 
a ~t~: lllumtnallcn ot Ute prohlt·m Ulrough 
dlscusslon ar.d drbate In the Senntc. 
I say that agam. I may ndd, howcv('r, 
that lit.tle whlch has smce tran J>ln.·d or 
has smce been said prompts me to 
modify these polnt.s In any slcutilcant. 
de~n·ee. 
Point 1: There musL be no n·trcaL o! 
the forces of freedom nt I3erltn. M1·. 
President, I said that, not once. but nL 
least six times during tile cour1.e of my 
remarks on Eebruary 12. Weeks llcforc 
that date. I had publicly endorsed a clrn!t 
Senate resolution wh!ch would have up-
held the position of the admim~tmtlon to 
stand fast That, I may ndd, 1::. the only 
resolution on the Ocrmt~n situation 
which I have endor.sed so Car. 
So far as I know. there h:\S not been 
any si!nlificant d11Tcrence nmong Demo-
crats and Republtcans, or between the 
Senate and the excutive branch or the 
Government, on the need to stand fast 
at Berlin. CerLninly there r.e\Cr ha.s 
been on my part.. 
Point 2: The German leaders or the 
t.wo Berlin commun!Ues z;hould be urced 
to begin serious etrort.s to unlry the pub-
lic senices and municipal covernmcnt. ot 
that city. I know, Mr. Prestdent., that 
there are those who will say l.hls ap-
proach is illusory and unrcallsUc: thl\t. 
the East Germans cannot be txpect.cd to 
a'!'Tee even on a common sewage system. 
let alone on a common munJctp,LI gov(·rn-
ment. I would point out In reply, how-
ever, that if Berlm doc:; not hnvc n com-
mon sewage system. It does have a com-
mon subway system. U the German 
leader of f.:ast. and West Berlin can 
agree on that, as they have, is 1t be~·ond 
the realm or the possible thai. they may 
a rec on other common public services, 
parUculnrly it they mean to ha\·e peace: 
or that they may reach a series or a •ree-
mcnts which might ultlmateh· lead to a 
single muniCJpal government for the 
ciLy? I must. ask: What stands m l!Je 
v.n\' or an inltin~1ve of this kind? What 
v.lll be lost by trym~: to bring about this 
PI'Ol:tess towa1d municipal unity m Ber-
lin? lt we mean to have peace. 1 be-
lieve the elTon should be made. It should 
be made not only to ease the danger of 
\\ar a~ this most cnttcal pomt. m Ger-
many: lt should be made, too. because 
If it IS succi'~ ful, out or the microcosm 
of D<'rhn could emerge patterns of unlft-
ca.tton for all of Ocrm:my. 
nm·Jin, or course, Is an aspect of the 
whole l>t·oblem or German unification but 
I~ Is ntso the most pressing and compel-
ling n.~pcct. It tS at Berlin and along 
th~ routes of access to that cit.y that the 
dnnsct· of conflict is greatest. In thnt. 
sr.nse tt requires the most immedinll' at-
tention, t·ven lf solution to 1ts prolllem 
or unification may be merely b~· means 
or interim soluttons, pendmg the out-
come or the "~~:hole problem or Oerman 
unlf1cnllon. SO tar as I know. ~rr. Presi-
dent, at present we are domg nothln.;, 
man otn lal sense, to bring about an at-
tcmpt.ut munlctpal uruty m Bertin. 
P.:>lnt 3: The conc1hatory senices or 
the United !'\ntlons and. part:cularly, or 
Its Secretary General. should be enltstcd. 
to try to dC\'clop an aii-Ber~m &ovem-
ment. lf such a go\·emmcnt does 
cmerce !n the murucipality, then a 
United Nations emergency force should 
replace both Cornmunls& and Allied 
fore~ In mnmtaing free access to the 
city from all directions. pending a l!l'n-
cral senlement of the German problem. 
So Car as I know. Mr. Pres1dent. no 
official steps ha\'C been taken In this 
d1rrcuon. There are hints. Mr. Prc~i­
clcnt, that If trouble does develop at Ber-
lin. then the matter will be taken to the 
Utui,C<l NaLtons I would deem It a. wel-
come chanJCe. Mr. President, for once t.o 
brii'IP the United Nations into an int~r­
natlonnl pu1.zle before, not after. th~: 
pieces IHlVc been hopelessly scat.te1ed. 
Tho~.c in the Senate who saw fit to 
comment on many parts of my l.l~t. 
st.ntt•rnent generally refrained !rom com-
ment on thiS polnt. 1 am not. prepared 
to conclude, however. that in Oermany 
at tlus lime there Is no poss1ble con-
st.ructtve role !or the Urut.ed Nations 
and the Secretary General. I bclle\·c 
that there Is somethln:~ to be !'aid for an 
attempt to brlno;: the Unl:ed Nations mto 
the slt.unUon. now. In the role or fire-
prc\·ention, not. merely later, in the role 
or nren ht.r.c. For my part. I '"oultl 
much prefer to see the whole city or 
Berlin neutrnllz.."'d on an int.enm basis, 
under United Nations auspices, lf that 
wn be obt.:Uned, rather than to ha\·c 
Ea.s~ German a •ents of the SOviet Union 
sl.:lmt>!ng the permits o! western a!lled 
transport.<~ to West Berlin. We can not. 
know v. hether ~uch an anan~tement can 
be obtained w1tll we try to obtain 1t. 
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And even l1 we cannot, what. shall we 
have sacrltlced by trying? 
Points 4 nnd 5: Unless a unified. neu-
tmlized BerLin under Unit.ed NaUons· 
auspices is e~tnbllshed as an interim 
measure, thf.'n Western forces must re-
mam In Berlin. regardle..«S of whether 
the Russians leave. It is t1me to think 
seriously, however, o! replacing as 
rap1dly as possible the thousands of non-
German alUed mllltary personnel In Bcr-
line v.1th West German militia. 
Here, IU!ain. Mr Pre•idmt. I find In 
present policy nothing comparable to this 
suggestion. Pres..nt policy, says, in 
effect. that lhe Russians must stay In 
Berlin-In spirit, IC not in bcdr. Apnrt 
from the fact thnt I see no praclleable 
v.-ay to make them stay In either tody or 
spirit i! they wl.sh to go, 1 am most re-
luctant to go along v:tth a pollcy that 
&eek.:> t.o reqwre the Russtans to stay any-
where westward. 11 they prop;;.se to take 
even a few steps backward-eastv.•ard 
I am fully aware that their goln~ may 
complicate our r(maintng In Becrlin. We 
shall be face to Caef.', then, with East Get·-
mans. They wl!l be Communls.s. to be 
sure--but. ne\'erthelcss. Germans. not. 
Russ1ans. The Allied forces may well be 
compeUed. 111 the la~t analYSIS, to face 
them, II we mean to stay m Bel'lin at aU 
costs. 
It was an awareness o! this probabili~Y. 
Mr. President, v.hlch prompted me to 
suggest that I~ Is Ltmc to t.hlnk scrlousiy 
of replacing the thousands of allied mili-
tary personnel In West Berlin whh West 
German malitia. lf there Is to be a loss of 
life among East. Cermans, in order to 
prrserve v.h:H ts, In the last a~alys's. a 
\Vest German position c\en more than 
an nlhcd posmon Ill Bcrhn. then tt seems 
to me best that. the aliacd forces move 
as quickly as possible to the re ene. rven 
as t.he Russtnns uncnd to do on the other 
side. This as not n matter of "pas lng 
the buck." It Is a mattrr of recognizm!( 
that among Germans ns nmon~ others, 
blood may wei) prove tlucker than ldeol-
o .1es. 
11. v;oJll 'be a tral!edy If men must die In 
this satuatlon In any event. It will hurt 
the cause of freedom in Germany even 
mon~. howe\•er, It th~ Germans who may 
lose thetr lives In a limited conflict !or 
access to Berhn Jose them by the uctlon 
of foreign forces. 
I know, Mr. Presltlrnt. thaL there are 
grave risks In usmrr West Germ:m forces 
in thiS Cashton Once lnJ<'ctcd Into the 
situation at Berltn, It Is dtlllcult to fore-
see the conunsenc:es which ma~· subl'<'-
quenth nrase. 'lhnt is why I snld It Is 
t•me to think sc••ou .. Jy of using them. not 
that it Is time to u:>e them. The rtsks 
must be wei' hc<l In the li::ht of all the 
ln!ormat1on and csumatcs available to 
the Execut1vc. They must be v.clf.;hed 
n~:ahlsL the countless nsks or trying to 
preserve, wtth Alhed forces. a status quo 
m a satuatton v. hlch will chan;::e, Inevi-
tAbly, once the Russl:tns have left Ber-
lm. There may be sound reasons !or 
not taking thts course or subslltutlnl" 
West Germans lor the Allied forces nc 
West Berlin. There are no sound rea-
SOilS. however. for not exploring fully 
Its impltcauons within our own Govern-
No 3~-10 
ment and with Allied governments, or 
for failing t.o do so promptly, 
Point 6: There must be a great deal 
or talk between Germans who are ID 
aut.hority in the Federal Republic and 
Germans who purport to be In authority 
In the Eastem zone. 
This iS the POint, Mr. President, of 
which much has been made in com-
-ments on my remarks of Februnry 12. 
It seems to me that a monumental Issue 
has been generated here, although, In 
1act, no subSt.anttal Issue exists. 
The administration-the Western al-
lies-have proposed talks with the Ru.s-
slans. at which each side might have 
German observers. In other words, East 
Germans and West Germans are both to 
be admitted to these t..alkS on Germany, 
1! the Russta.ns accept the Western pro-
posal. 
Now. Mr. President, does anyone be-
lle\·e that to talks on the German prob-
lem, these Germans-East and Wes~ 
Germans-are going to do nothing but 
observe? No, Mr. President; they arc 
obviously going to talk, the West Ger-
mans through the allied nations. the East 
Germans through the Soviet Union. If 
there is a dillerence between official pol-
Icy and what I suggested in this respect, 
iL is certainly a nltnor one. U 1 may 
draw an analogy, perhaps I can make tllc 
difference clear. I suggested, In effect, 
that the Germans-Enst and· West-go 
orr Into another room and try to come 
up with concrete proposals on the prob-
lem ot German unification, which they 
would then lay before the allied power:; 
and the Soviet Unton, for approval and 
!or 1!\Jarantee. 
Many or lho.c;e who have commented 
on this proposal have said m e!I.ct: 
"No. That Is a dangerous procedure." 
They have said-those who endorse pres-
ent offici!\! policy on this point-thQt 
the West Germans must whisper in the 
ear of the allies what they think should 
be done about unification and the East 
Germans must whisper In the ear of the 
Soviet Union. Then, the We-tern allies 
and the $o\'1Ct Union ~:ill add their own 
thoughts and try, out of the conglomera-
tion. to reach an agreement. 
Mr. President. either way is agreeable 
to me. Out or my own limited experi-
ence at International conferences. how-
ever, I have my own views as to '1\'hlch 
way l.s likely to offer greater pre<pect for 
success. Those who now conduct foreign 
poltcy have theirs. I am more than Will-
Ing to try their way II they believe it will 
v.ork. I have a teehng, however. that 
before we are done with this mat..ter or 
whispering In ears and the friction of no 
contact between the Germans. we shall 
be more thnn Willing t.o try others. 
Point 7: All-German elections may not 
be essential to peace and to freedom, but 
there must be some opportunity for tho 
people of E11.st Germany, as there Is In 
\Vest Germany, to express the1r PJllt cal 
preferences and to part:clpate In politi-
cal affairs without terror. Unless !.here 
is, the search for peace can lead to the 
jeopardiZing of freedom.. 
Here again, Mr. President. I do not 
believe there Is a basic difference be-
tween lhe present policies of this Oov-
ernment and the view which I stated. 
The Secretary of State made clear, long 
before my speech of February 1~ that 
all-Oennan elections need not be essen-
tial as a first step In German unltlca-
tlon. I do not know at what stage they 
would become esse"Qtlal, nor, with aU 
due respect. do I believe anyone else does 
at. thl.s time. 
The Secretary has recognl.zed that re-
e.Uty, and I applaud his recognition of 
it. I say further. however. that unless 
the hand of pollUcal terror begins to 
ll!L In East Germany there Is a danster 
to freedom in any form o! unification 
which may be tried. While this point 
has not been explicitly stated by the Sec-
retary, I am sure that those who are 
responsible :for the conduct of foreign 
policy are not unaware of it. 
Point 8: The Westem allies and the 
Soviet Union must guarantee for a pe-
riod of time the unified Germany which 
may emerge from discussions among the 
Germans. They must see to It that 
Cermany Is neither subjected to mili-
tary pt·essw·cs !rom its neighbors nor 
becomes a source o! military pressures 
to its neighbors. 
Again, Mr. President. there ls no dis-
agreement on this obvious point. It has 
long been a part. of the pOlicy or this 
Government t.o reeogni2e that a peace 
treaty for ~rmany, which provides !or 
the reasonable security needs of Its 
neighbors, lncludmg the Soviet Union, 
Is an essential o! peace. One may dllfcr 
with the way ~his obJective has been 
pu1·sued, but there are few ditrerences 
as to its essentle.Uty. 
Point 9: It Is essential that our policy, 
NATO's policies, do not exclude a care-
ful constdemtlon-may I repeat that 
word, "consideratlon"--of the Rnpack:t 
plan. the Eden plan for a demilitarized 
zone in middle Europe, or similar pro-
posa13 1n connection wltll the WJJficu-
tion of Germany, predicated-may I 
repeat that word, "pred1cated"--or con-
tingent upon the outcome of the con-
ferences on surprise attack. and suspen-
sion of nuclear tests now going on In 
Geneva. 
The Western Powers ha.ve indicated 
an interest in negotiating a European 
sacurlty pact.. We are now seeking an 
agreement. at Geneva, on the problem or 
nuclear tCJ;t!ng and the prevention o! 
surprise attack. 
Further. I am given to understand 
that It is the PQIIcy of this dovernmcnt 
to recognize thM agreement Is pos~l­
ble to exclude missile bases· !rom 1\11 
German soiL Slm!Ia.rly, that it. ls pos-
sible w thin out foreign forces In West 
Germany In 1·etum !or a thlnnlng out 
of Sovtet forvcs In East Germany. 
rt that is the case. Mr. President. 
there 1s no basic Incompatibility between 
the essentials that. I listed and what 
official poUcy 1s prepared-1 repeat that 
word, "preparcd"-to do. The obJec-
tive Is the same. I reserve the right. 
however, to examine subsequently the 
way we are gO!Dg about tryin~ to 
reach it. 
SIMILA!tiTil':S DI'TWTJ!N OJ'?'lCtAL POI..ICT ANI) 
.Nt:fE I'OfNT8 
The differences between what we are 
doing, as a matter of official pollcy, and 
what I suggested as the essentials of a 
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posluve Weltt'l"n policy on Germany, are 
not numeruus. In omclal policy-with-
out a shadow of a doubt on tho> part 
or nn}onc. ell.her Democrat or Republi-
Cilll-We nre committed tO stand fast at. 
B"rlln. We are committed t.o the par-
tlc1patlon or Germans of both 7.ones m 
the discussion or the prob!ems or German 
unity. We are eommiLted to explore "A'ays 
other than all-German elceUons, at least 
as a be~lnniDB of the solution to the 
problem of Germ.tn unity, We are pre-
pared to consider proposals v. hlch stek 
to limit certain types o! \\'eo pons and the 
allen military forces In both parts of 
G rmnny v.IUtin the framework of all-
1-:uropenn aecunty nrrnnt:cments. With 
these !'.SSCntlala, .Mr. President, I ex-
pressed substnntlg,J agrel'mcnt ln my re-
mnrks of }'<brunry 12. nlthou~h I rna~· 
differ ln pnrtlculnn; with respect to the 
way theY arc bclllK presently pursued. 
DIJ n ftltHCh Willi OFHC'IAL POLICY 
The basic paints nt which I diverge 
from wllut Is pre~cnt otnclnl policy, I be-
lieve, tu·<• these. 
First. Ofllcinl policy, In etTrct. says that 
the Russians cannot. le~we Berlin or the 
routes or acces.s to the clt.y from the 
West: certainly, that. they cannot. leave 
In spirit. and. perhaps, not even ln body. 
For my part, I would hnve no particular 
desire to £t·c them r.tay, In body or in 
sptrlt. even If they could be persuaded 
from golne. v.·hlch I doubt. 
&cone! Official pollcl dot>s not ~eek 
actively to try to bring about a unifica-
tion of the munlclp:tl :scn1ca and gov-
ernment of the two Bcrllns at. the prt>Sent 
time. 1 believe that eltort &hould be 
DUde. 
Third. omclal pollc}' docs not seek to 
enU.st the United Nations In the Berhn 
crists at this t.mc. l''or mr part. I be-
heve It Is high time thl\t thl.s be done: 
portlcularly, thnt. the concallntory !l('rv-
Jce.o; or the Secretary General be sou11ht. 
Fourth. Otflclnl policy t'l\'cs no evi-
dence o! considering replacing the 
thousands ot Alltrd forcts ln Berlin with 
Wc.:.t. Germans. Ir v.e art' not going t.o 
move or can no~ 1110\ c tn the direction 
ot trying to brln~: about the unity and 
Interim neutralization or all Berlin 
throul!h tJ.N. conclllntlon, then. I believe. 
for the reasons l have already staled. we 
must give ~crlou~ consideration to 
making this I'Cplttct'ment.. 
~'ONt'Lt Dl.NO COM M t' NT8 
Finally, Mr. President. 1 must bring to 
the attention of the St'nate the testl-
mQnY or Q('nCI't\1 Maxv.cll D. Taylor, the 
Chic! of Stnfl of the Army before the 
S•·nftte ntsn.rmamcnt Subcommittee on 
F~brunry 2. ~tlmony which w:~s re-
leased only lnst weelu·nd. The General 
said, In effect, that there must be tOtal 
mobUizatlon of this Nation It v. e are to 
resist force In ncrlln. I must ask: What 
Is being done tO bring nbout this total 
mobilization, or arc y;c t.o ~ume that. 
It v.IU not be llect'3:13ry? 
I hope deeply, Mr. President, that. 
rorec v. Ill not be brought Into play at 
Berlin but there .Is no certain promil.e m 
prcsen~ clrewnst:lnccs that tt lliiU not be. 
I reltcrnto my bt'llcf that lf there l.s to 
be n chance t.o nvold lt.s use. "a West.e:n 
inltlatl\ e for peace Is csscntlnl." 
The point.& which I raised in my re-
marks on February 12 were dWa;ned to 
lndtcate a possible direction tor that. tru-
tt.auve. 
Of equal Importance with the dulre 
for peace, :Mr. President. ls the enti1:Y 
and forbearance with which thl.S Gov-
ernment pursues this great need and 
desire of mankind. or greatf'St lmJ)Or-
tance is a nauonalleader,;hip which acts 
positively for peace. 
It the President l~ds In that !a.shlon, 
he v.·ill find the people ot this Nation 
and the people of the free lliOrld wUl 
be soladly beh!nd him. 
~Ir. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President. 
will the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
I\fr= FULBRIGHT. I should like to 
take this opportunity to express my np-
precla.tion, and I know the npprcclntlon 
o! the Senate. for the very fine Job the 
Senator from Mont.nna hnl! clone In 
bringing thl.s question before this body 
and the country, and In developing IL 
In such a logical and etTecUve wo.y, ns 
he did today and ns he did on Lhc pt·e-
vious occasion. I regret very much thnt 
illness p1·evented me !rom being here on 
the occasion of the previous speech on 
this subjec~ by the Senator from Mon-
tana.. The Senator has already Inspired 
a great deal of very fruitful discussion 
of this issue. and I think the country 
and the Senate will bcnent Immeasur-
ably from the ef'l'ort.s of the S<-nator from 
Montana. I WISh tO Jom all the other 
Senators who have comphm~ntcd the 
Senator from Montana for his effo1 ts, 
which have contnbuted so much to bet-
ter understanding ot this problem. 
Mr. :MAl-;SFIELD. I thank the diS-
tinguished chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations. 1 recall to the 
Senator's memory that we came to the 
Congress totether In 1943. and amcc 
that ume we nave had a fairly close re· 
lationsh•P in the foreaen policy field. Of 
course I am Indebted tO the Senator 
from Arkansas. the chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations. for 
his kind words, for his unfailing under. 
standing, and for his toloranct- and 
streqgth over the years gone by 
Mr. President, I now wish to turn to 
anobher subject. 
The PRESIDING OFI-'ICER. The 
Senator !rom Montana has the !loot'. 
February ~G 
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